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The Politics of National History: Russia’s Ruling Elite and the Centenary of 1917 
‘The lessons of troubles, revolution, the Civil War warn of how harmful to Russia are any schisms, [they] convince 
[us] that only unity of the people and social accord can lead to success, can guarantee the independence of the state 
and help repel any perfidious enemy.’1 
President Vladimir Putin, February 2016 
 
This article examines the approach of Russia’s ruling elite to the challenge of commemorating the 
centenary of the Russian Revolution, and thus what can be learned about both the mindset of 
Russia’s rulers and representations of the Soviet past in Russia today. Through consideration of 
these issues, it provides more general reflection on the role of history in contemporary Russian 
politics and Russian foreign relations. The ‘official’ commemoration of the centenary has been 
low-key, and the approach of the ruling elite has been based primarily on stressing the dangers 
and undesirability of revolution. However, through a reading of the country’s modern history that 
stresses the importance of a strong state and an overarching historical continuity, the Revolution 
and the subsequent course of Soviet power can be, and have been, integrated into the preferred 
national historical narrative. The article suggests that there has been a distinct, and quite 
deliberate, ambiguity in the approach of the Russian state towards the Revolution and its 
significance. This is a consequence not simply of the Soviet triumph over Nazi Germany and the 
geopolitical might of the USSR, but also the historically progressive influences of Soviet socialism.  
Keywords: Politics of history; commemoration; centenary of the Russian Revolution; Vladimir 
Putin 
 
The centenary of the Russian Revolution provides a welcome opportunity for its historians to 
observe and write about the politics of history and commemoration, and not just the historic events 
and processes themselves. The February and October revolutions of 1917 were events of global 
significance that have helped shape our world in myriad ways, leading to the establishment of the 
communist-led Soviet state. The ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, and the more general 
geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe, demonstrate that the consequences of Soviet power and 
the collapse of both the Eastern Bloc and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) itself 
have not yet been resolved. Following decades of communist rule, societies in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and central Asia, experienced abrupt, often traumatic transitions to post-communist 
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polities and market economies. New national identities have been and continue to be forged, with 
the shadow of the twentieth century looming large in that regard. Indeed, in countries that occupy 
the vast spaces of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, and due in large measure to their 
extraordinarily tragic and complicated experiences of twentieth-century dictatorships, one can 
observe with particularly sharp resolution the principal tendencies often apparent in the 
politicization of national histories. These are attempts to create a ‘maximally cohesive’ national 
identity, and to manage – or attempt to discard – the guilt associated with a country’s past.2 
     Identities, whether individual or collective, are bound inextricably with memory.3 In the context 
of national histories, commemorations of significant events have performative functions that 
reflect ongoing processes of constructing and affirming national identities, as well as claims to 
political legitimacy. Hence, major commemorations, or ‘memory events,’ offer us fascinating 
insights into the politics of history and public memory, a topic that has attained much prominence 
in several countries in recent years.4 The focus of the present article is the approach of the Russian 
state to the challenges of commemorating the centenary of the Revolution, at a time when the state 
has been acting as a bulwark against revolutionary situations in Ukraine and Syria, as well as 
attempting to undercut the potential for upheaval at home. There has been much discussion of 
1917 and its significance in Russian academia and media, and indeed in many parts of the world, 
during the centenary. However, within any polity, and especially one such as Russia’s, the state 
enjoys a rather privileged position in the production of the wider public discourse on national 
history, through its oversight of those features of ‘symbolic’ politics, such as commemorations 
and national holidays, that are concerned specifically with historical meaning.5 Hence, the 
rationale for specific studies of the ‘official line’ on 1917.  
     The central questions to be addressed here are the following: What can be learned about the 
mindset of Russia’s ruling elite through examination of their approach to the centenary of the 
‘Great Russian Revolution’ (as it is now usually referred to in Russia)? How does their 
representation of their country’s past reflect the concerns and policies of the state today? And how 
does the Soviet past, arising from 1917, find representation in the discourse of Russia’s ruling 
elite? We will see that the approach of the Russian state to the centenary has been based primarily 
on stressing the dangers and undesirability of revolution, and the importance of a strong Russian 
state. However, through a reading of the country’s modern history based on notions of statism and 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
The Politics of National History 
 
3 
 
an overarching historical continuity, the Revolution and the subsequent course of Soviet power 
can be and have been integrated into the national historical narrative. There have been imbalances, 
complexities, and ambiguities in how this has been done. The point, though, is that there has been 
ambiguity; the article argues that there is a place for the Revolution in the state’s historical 
narrative as foundation of the Soviet system, and that subtleties and complexities are often evident 
in the state’s approach to national history. We will also see that the state has been overtly 
committed to respect for the independence of the historical profession and a plurality of voices, 
despite its clear attempts to foster a unified (if ambivalent) historical narrative. In addition, 
discussions of the centenary and the Soviet past have become more politically charged in the 
context of the present nadir in relations since the end of the Cold War between Russia and several 
former Soviet neighbours, and between Russia and Western powers.  
     The article will begin with some brief, general comments on the revolutionary crisis a century 
ago, and the politics of historical commemoration, before an examination of official discourse 
(speech and written text produced by leading figures of state authority) on Russia’s revolutionary 
centenary. The principal source base is transcripts and reports of speeches delivered by, roundtable 
discussions involving, and interviews given by members of the ruling elite, published on official 
websites or reported in Russian media. By the ‘ruling elite,’ I mean the president and government 
ministers, and other politicians elected or appointed to senior positions of state. 
Revolution and Commemoration 
Memories and identities are representations of realities that develop over time through active 
processes of construction. Indeed, to remember is ‘to place a part of the past in the service of 
conceptions and needs of the present.’6 When it comes to collective acts of remembering and 
thinking through the past, social consensus is rarely achieved.7 Since 2014, and in some places 
before then, much of Europe and the wider world have been experiencing a series of centennial 
commemorations of seminal events and processes: wars, revolutions, and state formations. 
Historically, of course, political revolutions have been at the root of much controversy and division 
within and/or between identifiable national communities. Revolutions, almost by definition, are 
divisive events, and scholars often identify social fragmentation accompanied by a weak or 
weakened state as one of their crucial determinants.8 Intensely political and inherently 
unpredictable, they rarely involve consensus, and civil wars tend to follow. The resultant wounds 
in the body politic tend to heal with time, but revolutions of centennial vintage often retain divisive 
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potential. In any case, the commemoration of revolution can present a distinct challenge to 
incumbent authorities concerned by the possibility of revolutionary stirrings, or at least social 
discord, within their own societies or those of their strategic allies.  
     A century ago, Europe was experiencing a succession of extraordinary crises. The Russian 
revolutions of 1917 were the most dramatic and consequential results of broader processes of what 
Joshua Sanborn has described as decolonization in Central and Eastern Europe under the impact 
of the First World War. Four empires (Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman) 
collapsed into the ‘shatter zones’ of new national states, or in the case of the Soviet state, a new 
multi-ethnic, multi-national entity.9 Decolonization was accompanied by state failure and 
breakdown in social order, and the experience of military defeat and state collapse cleared the 
space, literally and metaphorically, for the ‘aftershocks’ of paramilitary violence, atrocities, and 
extremist politics.10 Largely phenomena experienced in Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe, 
the Irish Revolution and deployment of British paramilitary troops in Ireland, in particular, attest 
to the need for a broader geographic perspective. Socialism/communism and 
nationalism/racialised worldviews were the powerful revolutionary ideologies that helped ensure 
that subsequent decades in many parts of Europe were characterised by political extremism.  
     The Soviet state would prove to be the most violently destructive in modern peacetime 
European history. However, the Bolshevik party that began to seize power in Russia with the 
October Revolution was inspired by the idea of the complete liberation of Russia, and humanity 
in general, from the sufferings of capitalism and the horrors of imperialist warfare. Therein lies 
the great paradox of the October Revolution, which was by driven by ideological conviction and 
intended as a decisive moment of historic rupture that would alter the course of history. Reinhart 
Koselleck has explained that the concept of crisis as it relates to historical time ‘can mean that 
chain of events leading to a culminating, decisive point at which action is required.’ It can also 
mean ‘a unique and final point, after which the quality of history will be changed forever.’11 It is 
precisely in both those senses that Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, the Bolshevik leader, interpreted the 
political situation having returned to Russia in 1917. In the course of the summer, as the authority 
of the Provisional Government eroded and popular support for soviet power grew, he believed that 
the decisive time to act had arrived. The second, socialist revolution, he believed, would spark 
similar revolutions in other belligerent countries, and the promise of socialism and ultimately 
communism would come to be realised. 
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     As the Russian empire experienced its revolutionary convulsions, at the other end of Europe, 
Ireland also experienced a turbulent but much less bloody political transformation. The result was 
a war of independence from British rule, the creation of the Irish Free State that later became the 
Republic of Ireland, and a civil war. In 2016, Ireland marked the centenary of the Easter Rising, 
the ill-fated event that nonetheless helped spark the Irish Revolution. In Russia, as we will see, the 
centenary of 1917 was unavoidable but quite uncomfortable for the state, whereas the Irish 
government in Dublin fully embraced the pageantry of commemorating 1916. What is evident, 
though, is that authorities in both countries have attempted, to some extent, to ‘flatten’ or ‘dilute’ 
those revolutionary processes as significant ruptures in their respective national narratives. 
Historian John A. Murphy, writing in the Irish Times in 2015, highlighted acerbically the irony of 
the Irish government’s attempts ‘to sound notes of “inclusivity” and “reconciliation” about an 
event which was essentially aggressive and confrontational.’12 Murphy has touched upon the crux 
of the problem for governments when it comes to commemorating revolution, and this certainly 
applies also to Russia and 1917. 
Continuity, Consolidation, and Unity: Russia and 1917 
Context 
From the very outset of his time as president, Vladimir Putin has stressed the importance of social 
stability and unity, and the necessity for a strong state to guarantee Russia’s sovereignty. Taking 
office at a time of concern about the perceived weakness of the Russian state, declining 
international status, and violent conflict in the North Caucasus, President Putin’s administration in 
the early 2000s sought to undertake centralizing domestic measures that would strengthen the state 
and the power of the president.13 There has been a renewed tendency in this regard since Putin’s 
re-election as president in 2012.14 One can also observe the carefully scripted role that Putin has 
come to play as the personal embodiment of the nation’s strength, values, and unity.15 In addition, 
Putin’s administrations have increasingly taken advantage of anti-liberal sentiment in Russian 
society in order to promote a new wave of Russian nationalism. During his second term as 
president (2004-8), Putin and the ruling elite began to stress a sense of Russian particularism, and 
Putin acquired the reputation of an anti-Western leader at variance with internationalist 
neoliberalism (although the economic policies of the Putin era appear both neoliberal and state 
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capitalist).16 Furthermore, ‘anti-revolution’ has become an important component of the Putin 
presidency, although a more general negative attitude towards the country’s revolutionary past has 
been characteristic of Russia’s ruling elite since the 1990s.17 Indeed, Matthew Rendle and Anna 
Lively have suggested that, in a negative sense, ‘the concept of revolution for Putin is inseparable 
from his understanding of statehood and sovereignty, and is a crucial element of his political 
thinking and ideology.’18  
     Putin’s popularity in Russia rests to a large extent on the relative stability that has followed 
since the end of the 1990s, and the rhetoric of opposition to revolution serves to stimulate Russians’ 
fears of a return to disorder and chaos.19 The success of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of late 2004-
2005, along with mass protests within Russia itself in 2005, gave rise to authorities’ fears of a 
‘coloured revolution’ situation that could plausibly encompass Moscow. In response, as Robert 
Horvath has demonstrated, the Putin administration instituted a series of repressive measures and 
mobilizational strategies that have circumscribed the reality of democracy and pluralist politics in 
Russia, in the service of ‘preventive counter-revolution.’20 The opposition movement in Russia 
that arose earlier this decade has not managed to present a very serious challenge to the incumbent 
authorities, but it has surely served as a further warning to the ruling elite.21 Adapting Horvath’s 
analysis of ‘preventive counter-revolution’ to the politics of history, Mark Edele has illustrated the 
existence of a ‘historiographical front’ to recent state efforts at ‘inoculating’ Russian society from 
the ‘virus’ of revolution.22 The official approach to the centenary of 1917 has undoubtedly been 
formulated, in part at least, with a view to undermine attempts by political oppositionists to 
mobilize popular opinion against the incumbent authorities.  
     According to the public rhetoric of the Putin administrations, the threat of upheaval and 
revolution (in Russia or elsewhere in its realm of interests) is linked with the attempts of Western 
powers to ‘export’ revolution wherever it serves their purposes, providing a link between 1917 
and the present day.23 It is not a surprise, then, that the term ‘foreign agents,’ with its Stalin-era 
connotations, received legislative effect in an Act of 2012 that targets non-commercial 
organizations.24 This law prescribes that politically-engaged non-commercial organizations are 
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required to declare themselves as ‘foreign agents’ if in receipt of foreign funds, thereby building 
on legislation introduced in 2006 that targeted non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the 
aftermath of ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine.25 Furthermore, the rhetoric and practice 
of anti-revolution have played an important role in determining Russia’s relationship with the West 
under Putin.26 The Russian state’s hostile reaction to the popular revolt in Kiev from late 2013 and 
its subsequent behaviour in Ukraine, as well as its continued support for the Assad regime in its 
strategically important Middle Eastern partner, Syria, reflect complex and multi-faceted foreign 
policy considerations. The state’s responses should be understood not simply in terms of realist 
geopolitical confrontations with Western powers, economic interests, and concerns about Islamist 
extremism and its effects on the North Caucasus. They should also be understood through the lens 
of its deep-seated, ideological opposition to revolution and to subversive forces fomented or 
supported by foreign powers. This is associated with a conception of state sovereignty (‘sovereign 
democracy,’ when applied to Russia itself) that does not permit the international community to 
intervene in a country and determine its future course, in order to counter what Russia perceives 
as American-led Western global hegemony.27  Indeed, as Sergei Lavrov, the Foreign Minister, 
explained in an article of 2016 intended for an English-speaking audience, ‘we can see that the 
United States and its Western Alliance are trying to retain dominant position at all costs […] All 
kinds of coercive methods are used to this end [including] unconstitutional regime change 
techniques involving “color revolutions”.’ By contrast, Russia, according to Lavrov, ‘firmly 
believes in the preference of evolutionary change which should be made in such a form and at such 
a speed that would match the traditions of respective societies and their levels of development.’28 
Historical continuity and statism 
Within this context of ideological hostility to revolution, as the newspaper columnist Fedor 
Krasheninnikov has put it, for the ruling elite ‘1917 is the most uncomfortable year of Russian 
history for discussion.’29 If commemoration is typically about those ‘extraordinary events’ that 
embody a people’s ‘deepest and most fundamental values,’ then it should follow that 
commemoration of the Revolution should have little place in Putin’s Russia.30 In Soviet times, the 
anniversary of the October Revolution (on 7 November) was the foremost public holiday, the 
foundation myth of the state. In fact, until the Stalinist era, the February Revolution was marked 
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in the Soviet Union with a holiday on 12 March.31 Following the collapse of the USSR, 7 
November remained a public holiday, but in 1996 it was renamed the Day of Reconciliation and 
Concord. During the Yeltsin presidency, the February Revolution symbolised Russia’s democratic 
potential and Westward leanings, but the October Revolution stood for the tragedy of Soviet rule.32 
In 2004, with the beginning of Putin’s second term as president, 7 November ceased to be a public 
holiday at all. It is now overshadowed by the newly created Day of People’s Unity on 4 November 
that commemorates the end of the seventeenth-century ‘Time of Troubles.’ Revealingly, 7 
November is still the occasion for commemorating the military parade of 1941 on Red Square, a 
show of defiance with Nazi forces at the gates of Moscow, as it was once again in 2017.   
     The centenary of 1917 has been too significant for the state not to mark it. However, what we 
have seen in 2017, as noted by the editors of Revolutionary Russia, is that ‘faced with an event 
that does not fit neatly into the positive, patriotic and unifying version of Russian history promoted 
in recent years […] President Putin and his government have done relatively little to mark one of 
the greatest events of the twentieth century.’33 It was not until 19 December 2016 that Putin 
instructed the creation of a commission to oversee the commemoration, under the influential and 
state-connected Russian Historical Society (Rossiiskoe istoricheskoe obshchestvo – RIO).34 Key 
dates during the year, such as 12 March and 7 November, passed without much official 
recognition. Certainly, there was no public statement from Putin available on the official 
presidential website for those dates, and media reportage on 7 November concentrated on the 
ceremonial procession through central Moscow organised by the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation (KPRF).35 Nonetheless, the official commemoration commission was certainly busy, 
as was the ‘History of the Fatherland’ Fund (Fond Istoriya Otechestva - FIO), established in 
December 2016 by order of Putin. During the centenary year, there were 120 historical-educational 
events conducted under the auspices of the centenary commission, 70 of which received the 
financial support of the FIO.36 According to Anatolii Torkunov, chair of the centenary 
commission, officially-supported academic conferences in 2017 devoted to the Revolution were 
conducted in the spirit of free discussion and plurality of opinion, involving foreign as well as 
Russian historians.37 
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     Putin, as president, has displayed impressive interest in and knowledge of Russian history. 
Moreover, recognition of the importance of history, and more precisely a ‘usable’ past that stresses 
the positives of Russian statehood, has been characteristic of the Putin era as a means of fostering 
patriotic sentiment and a sense of unified national identity, a ‘new national ideal.’38 In a society as 
complex, variegated, and divided in socio-economic terms as Russia, history can be an especially 
important mechanism in that regard.39 Indeed, Sergei Naryshkin, Russia’s foreign intelligence 
chief and a key figure in the politics of national history as chair of the RIO, remarked in July 2017 
that it is impossible to overestimate the importance of history as an object of study for the 
‘upbringing’ (vospitanie) of patriotic Russian citizens not easy to ‘manipulate.’ In particular, 
Naryshkin singled out the importance of understanding Russian statehood (gosudarstvennost’) as 
an integral part of ‘great Russian culture’ (see below).40  
     With that perspective, the ruling political elite and pro-state cultural elite have more to work 
with when it comes to the Stalin era, the era of military glory and superpower status, than with the 
more controversial and divisive revolutionary era. During the Putin years, memory of victory in 
the Great Patriotic War has become the key, even sacred, element of the symbolic infrastructure 
of patriotic national identity.41 By contrast, the October Revolution can be seen to represent a 
misguided and reckless attempt to alter fundamentally the course of Russian history, and to 
undermine the strength and unity of the Russian state (largely within its imperial configuration). 
In early 2016, Putin caused controversy when he criticised Lenin for placing ‘an atomic bomb’ 
under the edifice of the Russian state by supporting a policy of national autonomy with right of 
secession within the structure of the USSR.42 Historian Ol’ga Vasil’eva, Minister of Education, 
succinctly explained this differentiated understanding of the Leninist and Stalinist eras in an 
interview in November 2016. With the October Revolution, she explained, the Bolsheviks ‘broke 
off continuity with pre-revolutionary history.’ From the 1930s, however, Stalin restored a sense of 
historical continuity, tapping into Russian patriotism as a tool for popular mobilization.43 To avoid 
misrepresenting Vasil’eva’s views on Stalin, she then stressed in the interview that Stalin had been 
a ‘tyrant.’ 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Politics of National History 
 
10 
 
     Some commentators in Russian-language media have labelled the approach of the ruling elite 
to the centenary ‘undefined and schizophrenic,’ or at least ‘incoherent,’ a result of the state’s 
selective and unbalanced approach to the Soviet past.44 The October Revolution presents a 
challenge, but under Putin the state has taken full advantage of other aspects of Soviet history, 
principally the wartime triumph over Nazi Germany, to mobilize patriotic sentiment and forge a 
sense of national unity. This has been accompanied by attempts firmly to police discussion of the 
Great Patriotic War. Most notoriously, a Presidential Commission to combat falsification of 
history (2009-12) was established under President Dmitrii Medvedev, and chaired by Naryshkin. 
After Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, and the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine, legislation 
was passed in 2014 that criminalises intentional ‘public distribution of lies’ about the Soviet Union 
in the war.45 Understandably, in advance of 2017, some Russian journalists questioned the state’s 
commitment to pluralist discussion of the centenary, in light of the fact that the ruling elite is not 
averse to declaring national history a matter of national security.46 In fact, in October 2016, 
members of the scientific council of Putin’s Security Council proposed establishing something 
akin to the original Presidential Commission in order to combat any deliberate distortions of the 
1917 revolutions. However, that proposal was rejected both by the Presidential Administration and 
by the RIO, on the basis that the content of discussions of the Revolution was the ‘prerogative of 
the scientific community.’47 
     What, then, is the state’s approach to the centenary? As a preliminary question, is it even 
possible to identify a coherent approach? Some scholars and journalists have drawn attention to 
certain divergences amongst relatively liberal and relatively conservative members of Russia’s 
ruling elite when it comes to appraisals of the Soviet era. For example, Thomas Sherlock has 
suggested that the state has struggled to find a dominant narrative on the Soviet period due to 
‘ongoing political struggles’ within the regime.48 Certainly, Medvedev sounded a more resolutely 
condemnatory tone than Putin when speaking about Stalinism during his presidency (2008-12), 
but the substance of their respective pronouncements seem closer than might initially appear.49 
Regarding the centenary of 1917, members of the ruling elite have provided slightly different 
messages or differences of emphasis in their pronouncements, but there is indeed a readily 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Politics of National History 
 
11 
 
identifiable official message, based on several factors. These are: acknowledgement of the terrible 
consequences of serious social divisions that lead to and result from revolution; stress on the 
importance of a strong state; emphasis on an overriding continuity in Russian history, which 
involves inserting 1917 into the narrative of a strong and particular Russian state; recognition of 
the importance of national unity and historical reconciliation; neutralisation of ideological 
appraisals and avoidance of any sustained engagement with revolutionary ideology, yet 
acknowledgement that there were globally positive effects of Soviet socialism; and a commitment 
to free discussion and the independence of professional historians. Related to this final point, Putin 
has acknowledged that Russia’s history has been characterised by dogmatism and enforced 
worldviews, and that there is no desire to return to that past.50 Despite the unambiguous hostility 
toward revolution on the part of the ruling elite, there is state recognition that the revolutions of 
1917 require thought, and a complex, multi-faceted – indeed ambiguous - intellectual approach.51 
In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in December 2016, Putin stated that ‘Russian society 
needs objective, honest, deep analysis’ of the events of 1917.52 In fact, one can find 
acknowledgement by representatives of the authoritarian Russian state that the revolutions were 
motivated by ideals of justice, and that they resulted in large measure from the failures of the tsarist 
regime to reform.53 
     The politics of commemoration, however, are readily apparent in elite political discourse. 
Central to this has been the motif of an essential continuity in Russian history that survived the 
Revolution. Naryshkin, for example, has described Russia’s history as ‘integral and continuous.’54 
This has been accompanied by attempts to foster a unified collective memory, and a tendency 
towards an outmoded positivism in historical methodology, ostensibly to counteract any 
‘rewriting’ of history (by foreign or Russian historians) for ‘geopolitical’ reasons.55 Indeed, there 
has been a consistent refrain by Russia’s leaders, certainly since 2013, that there should be a ‘single 
logic’ or a ‘single position’ in the teaching and understanding of national history.56 According to 
one scholar, this signifies the first occasion since the Soviet collapse that a Russian administration 
has attempted ‘to directly manage the production of an official narrative of Russian history.’57 In 
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May 2015, the Ministry of Culture, along with some prominent historians (though with some 
dissenting voices), approved an appeal to Russian society in advance of the centenary of 1917.58 
The appeal suggested that public - including academic - discussion of the revolutions should be 
‘directed at the consolidation of Russian society, the creation of a single civic position on the basic 
stages of Russia’s development.’ This single position would be formed of ‘recognition of the unity 
of historical development’ from the Russian empire through the USSR to the present Russian state, 
and realisation of the ‘tragedy of social schism called forth by the events of 1917 and the civil 
war.’ The political agenda behind the state’s approach to the centenary is more apparent still in 
Putin’s comments to some business leaders in February 2016 (quoted in the epigraph) that the 
lessons of the Revolution and the subsequent ‘Russian’ Civil War should serve to warn of the 
dangers to Russia of serious societal division and dissent. It is only through ‘social consensus,’ he 
suggested, and increased government attention to the importance of patriotic upbringing of 
citizens, that the independence and security of the state can be guaranteed.59 The ‘independence’ 
of the state here is undoubtedly a reference not just to the absence of foreign meddling in Russia’s 
affairs, but also to Russia’s strength on the world stage. This, presumably, is partly what Putin had 
in mind in 2005 when he famously described the collapse of the USSR as a ‘geopolitical 
catastrophe,’ resulting in several years of ‘disintegration’ at home and loss of great power status 
abroad.60  
     Of course, the rhetoric of a ‘single logic’ and ‘social consensus’ in representations of national 
history sits uneasily with commitment to respect for multiple interpretations of the past. Similar 
dissonance has been evident in Putin’s pronouncements on historical matters for at least a decade. 
As Mark Edele has observed, Putin, with his inclination towards a positivist understanding of the 
past, does not appear to perceive ‘the contradiction between the ideological function of history and 
the insistence that a plurality of views should be expressed.’61 However, to reiterate, the state’s 
approach to the centenary has recognised the legitimacy of diverse appraisals, despite – or 
alongside - the discourse of ‘social consensus.’  On the actual centenary of the October Revolution, 
the newspaper Izvestiia published an article by Valentina Matvienko, Chairperson of the 
Federation Council (upper house of parliament) and member of the ruling United Russia party. 
Matvienko acknowledged that diverse interpretations of the Revolution and sometimes heated 
debates do of course exist in Russia, and she welcomed the plurality of views expressed through 
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various media. What matters, she noted, is that the Russian people have supposedly proven ‘wiser’ 
than to allow any tensions to manifest in outbursts of serious disorder. Such ‘wisdom,’ according 
to Matvienko, is in contrast to the violence that erupted in North Carolina in summer 2017 over 
the controversial statue of the Civil War general Robert E. Lee.62 Nonetheless, Matvienko’s 
appraisal of social discordance during 2017 appears rather sanguine. The film Matil’da, which 
depicts the relationship between the ballerina Matilda Kseshinskaia and the young Nicholas II, 
generated much controversy for several months. It was finally released in October 2017, but not 
without considerable protest from Orthodox-monarchist groups (Nicholas II and his family were 
canonized by the Orthodox Church in 2000).63 A more pointed indication of irony in relation to 
the state’s call for ‘reconciliation and accord’ is the fate of the monument devoted to the 
reconciliation of Reds and Whites in the Civil War, which was due to be erected in Crimea for the 
Day of People’s Unity in November 2017. This monument, proposed by the Russian Military-
Historical Society (RVIO) with the backing of the Ministry of Culture, generated bitter opposition 
from both local communist supporters and veterans, and White sympathisers. By November, local 
authorities had at least deferred the idea.64 What is clear, then, is that there are unmistakeable limits 
to the state’s ability, and desire, to control historical discussion and symbolic meanings. 
     To return to the appeal of the Ministry of Culture and Putin’s remarks of February 2016, both 
underline the particular statism that forms such a central component of the ideology of Putin’s long 
tenure as president. Such statist ideology suggests the importance for Russia of a ‘strong state 
power, supported by all strata of the population,’ and the mistake of counting on foreign powers 
for help in internal political struggles.65 David Brandenberger writes that, rather than simply 
promote patriotism, national history in Russia under Putin ‘holds that the state is better equipped 
to safeguard Russian national interests than grassroots political parties, social movements, or civic 
organizations.’66 This iteration of statist ‘political consolidation’ under Putin is the most recent 
example of a phenomenon that has a long pedigree in Russian and Soviet history.67 Putin’s remarks 
and the Ministry’s appeal also highlight the elite’s ideological hostility to the very thought of 
revolution, and their insistence that ‘peaceful,’ reformist methods of resolving social tensions 
should always be chosen above revolution. The most unambiguously hostile appraisal of the 
Revolution has come from the Orthodox Church, which has regained much influence in Russian 
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society after 1991. Citing the destruction of life and freedom that resulted from 1917, as well as 
Bolshevik repressions of the Church, the Patriarch marked the centenary of the February 
Revolution by castigating the Revolution as a ‘great crime.’68 
     Yet, one of the effects of a consensual and integrative approach to the country’s past, informed 
by a statist political culture, is that elements of the national story most likely to generate significant 
public divergence should be accepted as unchangeable parts of that story. This helps explain the 
persistent ubiquity of Soviet symbolism throughout Russia, especially the image and name of 
Lenin. Responding to a question about this from German radio in summer 2017, the executive 
director of the FIO, Konstantin Mogilevskii, averred that ‘nobody would support’ the removal of 
Lenin monuments, and he implied that efforts to ‘wage war with spectres’ of the past would 
unnecessarily challenge ‘social consensus.’69 It is evident, then, that the overwhelmingly negative 
phenomenon of revolution must somehow be integrated into the grand national narrative. It must 
be ‘owned’ as part of ‘our’ history. One of the fullest and most interesting discussions on this 
theme of state continuity in Russian history, and how the Revolution can be integrated into the 
narrative, is a lecture delivered in November 2015 at the Moscow State Institute for International 
Relations (MGIMO) by the Minister of Culture, Vladimir Medinskii.70 His central argument in 
that lecture was that the victor in the Civil War was neither the Reds nor the anti-Bolshevik Whites, 
but ‘historic Russia’ (istoricheskaia Rossiia); that is, a strong, integral Russian state that triumphed 
through Russia’s revolutionary troubles. This seemingly agentless, supra-human historic destiny - 
‘that same Russia that existed a thousand years before the revolution, and will exist in the future’ 
- was more powerful than any human volition. Medinskii’s reasoning is that the historic role of the 
Bolsheviks was to give effect to this essential continuity of Russian history, to restore the authority 
and integrity of a Russian state that encompassed much of the former empire. According to 
Medinskii, the service rendered by the Bolsheviks to the deeper logic of Russia’s history occurred 
regardless of their ‘utopian conceptions.’ Through such an interpretive strategy, Medinskii is able 
not only to assert a statist reading of the Revolution, but to suggest a framework for reconciling 
opposing views of the legitimacy or otherwise of the February and October revolutions.71 
     Medinskii’s viewpoint suggests that a rather complex attitude towards the Revolution, and 
perhaps even to Lenin and Leninism, is available to Russia’s political and intellectual elite. This 
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is consonant with what Thomas Sherlock suggests is the more general approach to the Soviet past 
on the part of the state, based on the assembly or ‘bricolage’ of diverse, often contradictory features 
of that past to buttress the patriotic unity of state and people.72 On the one hand, Leninism was 
about ‘smashing’ the existing state, and there would appear to be little use in its ideological 
substance. On the other, it served a useful role in helping to reconstitute a strong state power. 
However, ambivalence towards the Revolution derives not simply from a statist reading of Russian 
history. ‘I would say that the Revolution was a tragedy,’ acknowledged Konstantin Mogilevskii  
of the FIO, but a tragedy that ‘in the final analysis catalysed progress.’73 Explicit acknowledgement 
of such ambiguity has in fact come from the very apex of political power, especially when directed 
at an international audience; both Putin and his foreign minister have been rather expansive about 
what precisely constitutes the Revolution’s historic ‘progress.’  
     Unsurprisingly, as foreign minister, Lavrov (in an article published in English) has lauded the 
service rendered by the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in deterring American-led nuclear 
aggression, and in supporting post-war decolonization. More interesting perhaps, Lavrov has 
referenced the Soviet welfare state as a model for Western European post-war welfare systems, 
adopted in response to the threat of Soviet-style socialism.74 Putin, in remarks at the international 
Valdai discussion club in October 2017, similarly acknowledged the ‘powerful stimulus’ provided 
by Bolshevik ideology and the Soviet state for positive developments in the West. In particular, 
he mentioned rises in living standards, increased gender equality, labour reforms, educational 
provision, the overcoming of racial segregation in countries such as the United States, and a more 
general advance in human rights.75 In fact, in early 2016, Putin remarked that he had not joined 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union out of necessity, and that he continued to see attraction 
in the almost biblical ideals of socialism and communism.76 The effects of the collapse of the 
USSR, according to Lavrov and Putin, have been an increasingly precarious global security 
situation, a consequence in large measure of the hubris of the West. In addition, Lavrov has pointed 
to growing socio-economic inequalities and neoliberalism in much of Europe and the United 
States, in the absence of the Soviet alternative. Thus, Lavrov and Putin have been able to suggest 
that the current Russian state is more than a continuation of a historically strong state; it is also the 
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successor to a historic state - whether Muscovy, imperial Russia, or the Soviet Union - that has 
served an integral and at times leading role in determining and advancing ‘European civilization.’77  
     The discourse of historical continuity, then, points to the ambivalent, complex, and somewhat 
incoherent views of the ruling elite regarding the October Revolution and its consequences. Yet, 
it also suggests a certain harmonisation between the views of the ruling elite and those of large 
sections of Russian society. An opinion poll conducted by the respected Levada Centre in March 
2017 found that 38% of respondents thought that the October Revolution had played a largely 
positive role in Russian history (25% thought it largely negative), mainly because of its stimulation 
of social and economic development. Half of respondents thought that Russia after 1917 had 
continued along a path in accordance with its traditions and national particularities.78 It should also 
be noted that amongst Russian and Western scholars, a consensus to a large degree has developed 
that the Revolution ought to be written into the broader narrative of modern Russian (and 
European) history. In particular, historiographical emphasis over the last twenty years has 
highlighted the significance of the First World War as the context of the Revolution, and historians 
have noted the relevance of a particular inclination towards statism in Russian political culture.79 
In other words, in somewhat Tocquevillian fashion, it is important to recognise continuities – as 
well as changes - in state practices and cultural attitudes across 1917.  
     However, and obvious though it may seem, stress on historical continuity on the part of Russia’s 
ruling elite reflects their political concerns. Part of the impulse behind this is the role of historical 
contention in present-day international relations. Particularly acute in this regard are suggestions 
of immoral equivalence of Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union. In several former Soviet 
states, such as Latvia and Estonia, museums of Soviet occupation established after the fall of the 
USSR have attempted precisely to convey that message, accompanied by more general attempts 
to portray Russia (in whatever historical form) as the historic enemy Other.80 Furthermore, in 2009 
both the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) passed condemnatory resolutions that implied a certain 
amount of equivalence between both ‘totalitarian’ regimes.81 Such suggestions are certainly 
understandable. However, in light of the enormous sacrifices borne by the wartime Soviet 
population, and the importance of the Soviet triumph over the Nazi regime in constructions of 
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patriotic Russian identity, one can also understand that they are viscerally and intellectually 
unacceptable to the Russian state and much of Russian society. 
     Lavrov’s article of 2016 draws attention to concerns amongst Russian political and intellectual 
elites that the centenary of the Revolution would provide another channel for Western anti-Russian 
commentary, a depiction of the October Revolution as ‘some barbaric coup that allegedly messed 
up the entire history of Europe; or still worse, to equate the Soviet regime to Nazism.’82 At the first 
meeting of the official centenary organisation committee in January 2017, Mikhail Shvyidkoi, 
Putin’s representative for matters of international cultural cooperation and a former Minister of 
Culture, similarly warned that the centenary would likely be used in anti-Russian Western media 
to criticise Soviet history in its totality.83 These comments were echoed somewhat by Putin himself 
in the last of his interviews with the US filmmaker, Oliver Stone, aired in June 2017. In that 
interview, Putin criticised the ‘excessive demonization’ of Stalin as ‘one means of attacking the 
Soviet Union and Russia.’84 It would appear important, then, that the Russian state would provide 
its own narrative (outlined above) to counter-act such appraisals, for both a domestic and 
international audience.  
     On the basis of those remarks, it is instructive to note that in January 2018, the Ministry of 
Culture temporarily revoked permission to allow screenings in Russian cinemas of the successful 
British-French satirical comedy film, The Death of Stalin (2017). This came as a response to 
condemnation of the film by the Ministry’s Public Council, members of which cited the film’s 
‘pollution’ of the country’s ‘historical symbols,’ and its disrespectful portrayal of Marshal Zhukov. 
The chair of the Council, the writer Iurii Poliakov, described the film in terms of ‘ideological 
struggle with our country.’85 Criticisms of the film demonstrate that Russian cultural and political 
elites have appropriated the vogueish language of ‘information warfare’ between the West and 
Russia reminiscent of the Cold War, but they also suggest the depth to which elements of the 
Soviet past are bound with projections of Russian identity in the present. Screenings of The Death 
of Stalin would diverge from the tendency in Putin-era Russian cinema to utilise the genre of 
historical film to reflect a patriotic image of the country and its citizens.86 Nonetheless, Putin has 
explicitly stated that it would be impermissible to ‘ban anything’ such as a film or publication 
unless it were actually criminal in nature.87 
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The Soviet past and political repression 
One very significant dimension to the politics of history and memory in Russia and the legacies of 
the October Revolution, and the most obvious challenge to the overriding narrative of 
gosudarstvennost’ (statehood), is the extraordinarily repressive history of the Soviet state. This is 
the question of a Russian Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past). How should 
the terrible history of political repression and violence in the USSR and Eastern Bloc be 
approached? How thorough, intensive, and extensive should be official and public examination, 
debate, and acceptance of this history? What should the attitude be to those individuals and 
organisations that try to keep that aspect of the Soviet past at the forefront of public memory? 
These are complex questions for much of the country’s political and intellectual elite, as well as 
for Russian society. The violent history of the USSR presents a further complication to the Russian 
state because, in 1991, Russia’s newly independent leaders determined that the state would become 
the legal successor to the USSR. Russia’s relations with post-Soviet and post-Eastern Bloc states 
are, quite often, closely associated with the issues of Soviet occupation and repression.88  
     Once again, the message from Russia’s ruling elite is not entirely clear. Contrary to the general 
impression of scholars and others that Putin’s presidency has allowed for a positive appraisal of 
Stalinism that reflects an increasingly authoritarian and belligerent regime, the reality is more 
complex.89 In recent years, there has been unequivocal state condemnation of the political 
repressions of the Stalin era. On 30 October 2017, a state-funded national monument to victims of 
political repression in the USSR, the ‘Wall of Sorrow,’ was opened in central Moscow by Putin. 
Speaking after Putin at the opening of the monument, Vladimir Lukin, chair of the memorial fund 
for victims of political repression and member of the Federation Council, lamented that young 
generations are well versed in their forebears’ triumphs but know little of the tragedies of mass 
repression and Stalinist totalitarian dictatorship. Those terrible tragedies, he urged, should also be 
‘part of our historical memory.’90 In fact, the violence that accompanied the Russian Revolution 
is sometimes cited by those that speak out most firmly in principled opposition to revolution. In 
an interview with a state news agency, the authoritative historian Aleksandr Chubar’ian of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, a leading figure within the RIO, stated that the main lesson of 1917 
is that revolution should never be repeated because it suggests ‘violence and victims.’91 
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Nonetheless, it is clear that the ruling political elite would rather focus on a more triumphant 
narrative of the country’s past, one that posits national overcoming of past traumas. 
     In his annual speech to the Federal Assembly in December 2016, Putin addressed the imminent 
centenary and stated plainly that the lessons of national history are needed ‘for reconciliation, for 
strengthening the social, political, civic consensus that we have today achieved.’ ‘We are one 
people,’ he noted, ‘and we have one Russia.’ Hence, he continued, it is ‘impermissible to drag 
along the splits, rancour, resentments and bitterness of the past in our present-day lives.’ To defy 
this would be, as he put it, to ‘speculate’ for particular political or other reasons ‘on the tragedies 
that affected practically every family in Russia, regardless of which the side of the barricades their 
forebears were.’92 Putin’s statement could be read as a reference to the long history of political 
repression in the Soviet Union, and not just to the divisions of the Civil War that were his ostensible 
focus. Rather more unambiguously, Putin concluded his address at the opening of the ‘Wall of 
Sorrow’ with the message that it would be impermissible to agitate for a settling of old accounts 
(in relation to the violence of the Soviet state). Nothing or nobody should ‘push’ society towards 
confrontation on that basis.93 The implication seems to be that it is time to draw a line under the 
sorrow and mourning of the past and to move on, to affix its place in national history as something 
to be condemned, but not to encourage further deep excavation.94 The present nadir in relations 
with Western powers suggests that this attitude is unlikely to change soon, as the state will seek to 
reinforce patriotic pride in the positive achievements of the Soviet regime. It is within this 
ideological context that one can understand the tense relationship between the state and Memorial, 
the internationally-renowned human rights organisation that has for almost thirty years been at the 
forefront of attempts to memorialise the victims and research the processes of Soviet repressions. 
Memorial has been accused by Kremlin supporters of proffering a type of memory politics that 
occasioned a ‘crisis’ of national identity in the early 1990s, through comparison of Stalinism and 
fascism.95 Most recently, Memorial has been embroiled in legal charges of having violated the 
2012 law on foreign agents.96 Indeed, Memorial’s struggles might serve to illustrate the potentially 
admonitory implications of the official search for ‘reconciliation’ and ‘consensus.’  
Concluding thoughts 
The centenary of the Russian Revolution has provided a fascinating opportunity to observe the 
politics of history in contemporary Russia, to understand the complex portrayals of the Soviet past 
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in projections of contemporary Russian national identity, and to enhance awareness of the 
controversies of historical representation in post-Soviet and post-socialist spaces. Russia’s ruling 
elite have adopted a low-key approach to the centenary. This is a consequence of their ideological 
hostility toward revolution, as well as the unavoidable public attention during the centenary on the 
fate of the authoritarian tsarist regime, and the revolutionary ideals that animated those historic 
events and processes. The state has no desire to concentrate that attention even more. Yet, the 
centenary is too significant to be ignored, and this article has suggested that it does in fact have a 
place in the state’s preferred national historical narrative. The message of the ruling elite has been 
that the current administration is the legitimate heir to and guarantor of the historic role and even 
destiny of Russia as a strong, integral political power, a message that is especially important at a 
time of deteriorating relations with Western powers. Their message has also been that the 
continued security of the state is not guaranteed, and that forces from without or within must be 
prevented from undermining it. Indeed, as Il’ia Kalinin has perceptively observed, the official state 
discourse of historical ‘reconciliation’ and ‘social consensus’ undoubtedly serves ‘to smear any 
oppositional activity as synonymous with the cataclysmic image of revolution.’97 Yet, however 
challenging the ruptures of 1917 might appear to the narrative of ‘historic Russia’ as a strong and 
persistent state power, the revolutionary upheavals of a century ago have been presented in a way 
that reinforces that narrative, allowing for absorption and integration of the Revolution and 
Bolshevik state-building. However alien to the incumbent elite is the communist idealism of the 
founders of the Soviet state, that same state and political system oversaw the glorious triumph in 
the Great Patriotic War, and attainment of a position of global influence and leadership through its 
alternative to American-led liberal-capitalist hegemony. Hence, there has been a distinct (and at 
times quite deliberate) ambiguity and complexity in the state’s appraisal of the Russian Revolution, 
despite its predominantly negative tone.  
     The critical importance of concord between the state and the people has had a long pedigree in 
modern Russian political thought. The role of the individual leader and the cult of the leader’s 
personality have historically served to embody this, and Vladimir Putin plays that role today in a 
way not witnessed in Russia for quite some time. A unified historical narrative and historical myth 
have also been significant components of an idealised projection of national unity. During the 
centenary of the Russian Revolution, the official discourse of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘consensus’ 
have seemed at times almost farcical, as demonstrated most clearly by heated manifestations of 
discontent over the film Matil’da, and over construction of the proposed Reconciliation monument 
in Crimea. Nonetheless, the ruling elite has attempted to play up the supposed strength of 
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democracy in Russia by pointing to the fact that the centenary year has passed without any 
significant manifestations of disorder over the public memory of events fundamentally important 
for the history of the country. There is also recognition on the part of the ruling elite that perhaps 
the key lesson of 1917 is the duty of the state to serve the needs of its people, and to avoid a 
potentially catastrophic future revolutionary situation.98 The other - and often dominant - side to 
this sense of concord, or social contract, between state and people in Russian political culture is 
the duty of citizens to the broader collective and to the state, and the tendency for those groups or 
individuals that challenge this to be cast as unpatriotic and even treacherous. The extent to which 
political and cultural elites, and indeed ordinary citizens, truly believe the message of patriotic 
unity is open to question. However, that message has certainly helped to serve as a powerful 
mobilizing force and as a bulwark against the rise of widespread political opposition, especially in 
the face of heightened Russophobia in the West. It appears that Russia’s rulers have learned some 
lessons from 1917, but how deeply they have done so remains to be seen.  
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